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Aircraft combat survivability has developed into a
discipline of its own. This thesis presents a brief over-
view of the two integral parts of survivability, suscepti-
bility and vulnerability. It examines the probability of an
aircraft being killed given a single shot fired by the enemy.
It further examines the redundancy of critical components and
the effect redundancy has on the probability of kill of the
aircraft. Several numerical examples are given. The thesis
also examines the Antiaircraft Artillery Simulation Computer
Program, and the modifications required in order to intro-






II. PROBABILITY OF KILL GIVEN A SINGLE SHOT 11
A. PROBABILITY OF HIT DENSITY FUNCTION 11
B. PROBABILITY OF KILL FUNCTION GIVEN A HIT .... 13
III. REDUNDANCY AND THE P^g 17
IV. PROBABILITY OF KILL AND REDUNDANCY 25
V. AFATL P001 COMPUTER PROGRAM AND THE PR/H .... 35
VI. CONCLUSIONS 46
APPENDIX A. EVALUATION OF EQUATIONS 47
APPENDIX B. P CALCULATIONS THROUGH THE TRANSITION
MATRIX METHOD 56
APPENDIX C. P001 'FIRE' SECTION 59
LIST OF REFERENCES 61
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 62

LIST OF TABLES
1. CUMULATIVE PROBABILITIES OF KILL FOR EXAMPLE
AIRCRAFT 32




1. VULNERABILITY OF TWO SEPARATE REDUNDANT CRITICAL
COMPONENTS, COOKIE CUTTER APPROACH 19
2. VULNERABILITY OF TWO SEPARATE REDUNDANT CRITICAL
COMPONENTS, CARLETON APPROACH 20
3. AIRCRAFT KILL TREE DIAGRAM, FIRST HIT 27
4a. AIRCRAFT KILL TREE DIAGRAM, SECOND HIT ALONE ... 27
4b. AIRCRAFT KILL TREE DIAGRAM, SECOND HIT ALONE ... 28
4c. AIRCRAFT KILL TREE DIAGRAM, SECOND HIT ALONE ... 28




Since World War I, aircraft combat survivability has
become a factor of constantly increasing importance to both
pilots and aircraft designers alike. The definition of air-
craft combat survivability which will be adopted in this
study is "the capability of an aircraft to avoid and/or
withstand a man-made, non-nuclear hostile environment" [1].
Given an aircraft flying in a hostile environment,
there is a probability that the aircraft will be hit by a
damage causing mechanism and a different probability, that
the damage causing mechanism will have the catastrophic
effect of killing the aircraft. These two probabilities are
of paramount importance, and they will be given special
attention.
The probability that the aircraft will be hit, PH ,
is usually referred to as the susceptibility of the aircraft,
while the probability that the aircraft will be killed, given
that it has been hit, pK /H / is called the vulnerability
of the aircraft.
A. SUSCEPTIBILITY
Assuming that the enemy is alert and possesses weapons,
aircraft susceptibility is influenced by the enemy's ability
to detect, identify and track the aircraft; launch and

direct threat propagators toward the aircraft; and detonate
them at or near the aircraft. If one identifies two phases
during the flight of the aircraft, i.e., prelaunch and after
launch of the threat propagator, then these abilities can be
measured by PT , the probability that the aircraft has been
detected, identified and tracked, and by P , the proba-
bility that a threat propagator is being launched and
detonated at or near the aircraft. Thus, susceptibility PH
is given by
P = P * P (1)
B. VULNERABILITY
Aircraft vulnerability is primarily influenced by the
aircraft's design. Any survivability features built into
the aircraft, such as redundancy, armor plating, and the
ability of critical components to operate after taking a
hit, will decrease its vulnerability, PK/H •
The probability of the aircraft being killed, PR , is
the product of its susceptibility and vulnerability. Thus
P
K " PH * PK/H (2 >
PR is related to the probability of survival of the air-




= 1 - PK (3)

This study will examine the computation of the proba-
bility of kill of an aircraft and how it is effected by




II • PROBABILITY OF KILL GIVEN A SINGLE SHOT
The probability of an aircraft being killed given a
single shot, pkss ' ^s ^ased on the assumptions that the
aircraft has been detected, and that a threat propagator has
been fired or launched. With these assumptions, the pKSS
becomes solely a function of the fire control system's
ability to direct the threat propagator in the vicinity of
the aircraft and the aircraft's vulnerability. Thus, the
expression for the PKSS ^n a one-dimensional analysis is
£PKSS * PH(X) * PK/H (X) dX <4)
and in a two-dimensional analysis is
PKSS pH(x,y) * PK/H (x,y) dxdy (5)
where pH (x) is the probability of hit density function at
x
,
and PK /H (x) is the probability that the aircraft will
be killed given that it has been hit at x .
A- PROBABILITY OF HIT DENSITY FUNCTION
The probability of hit density function is the mathe-
matical expression of the ability of a fire control system
11

to direct a threat propagator in the vicinity of the air-
craft. In most PKSS assessments, the normal or Gaussian
density function is used. If the propagator paths are
uniformly distributed around the aircraft, the one-
dimensional circular normal is applicable. This function
has the form
2
pH(r) m S* exp ( * ^T * ° - r - °° (6)
a 2a
where r is the propagator miss distance (with respect to
r = 0) , and a is the standard deviation, which is a
measure of the dispersion of the shots about the target.
This density function p„ , . is used to determine the
probability that any shot will have a miss distance that
lies within a certain band defined by r, and r2 . This




P I ^ - r r
2
*H' % exp ( - E-y ) dr (7)r
l J
*i (T 2cT
It is important to note that the probability that any shot
lies within the band r, and r2 - °° is unity.
In the two-dimensional analysis, the bivariate normal
distribution in the x-y intercept plane is used for the
12

probability of hit density function. This two-dimensional







' 2 *?) * ft (8)
where a and a are the standard deviations in the x
and y directions, respectively, and u and u are the
x y
mean values of the shots about the x and y axes,
respectively. The mean value represents a bias or aiming











where N is a large number of shots and x. , y. are the
x and y coordinates of the ith miss distance.
B. PROBABILITY OF KILL FUNCTION GIVEN A HIT
For contact warheads, the aircraft vulnerability can be
represented by the vulnerable area A , where any hit within
the vulnerable area causes an aircraft kill. In the one-
dimensional analysis, the vulnerable area becomes a circle




and the PK/H / °r kill function is given by
PK/H = 1 for ° i r i rv
for r > r
This type of kill function is referred to as a Cookie Cutter
kill function.
Another kill function of particular interest has the
form
K/H
K/H - exp < - ^y ) (10)
and is referred to as a Carleton kill function. Note,
that once again, the area under this PK /u curve is the
vulnerable area A
v
For the two-dimensional analysis, the circular Carleton
kill function becomes
P
R /H (x,y) - exp
*- + ML. (11)
2 2 2
where r has been replaced by x + y in equation (10) .
14

Substituting equations (6) and (9) into equation (4) and
evaluating the integral, the one-dimensional probability of
kill given a single shot for the Cookie Cutter kill function
becomes




When equations (6) and (10) are substituted into equation (4) ,
the one- dimensional probability of kill given a single shot






When equations (8) and (11) are substituted into equation (4)
,
the two-dimensional probability of kill given a single shot


















2 2If one assumes A < < a .a then









Thus, according to equation (15) , PKSS *s a linear function
of the aircraft's vulnerable area.
Detailed evaluations of equations (12) , (13) and (14)
are included in Appendix A.
16

III. REDUNDANCY AND THE PKsg
As it was previously defined, vulnerability is the
inability of an aircraft to withstand one or more hits by
damage causing mechanisms. The higher the vulnerability of
an aircraft, the worse its chances of survival are. Thus,
one might say that vulnerability is a disadvantage in an
aircraft. In order to reduce the vulnerability and overcome
this disadvantage, designers are utilizing six vulnerability
reduction concepts [1], one of which is component redundancy.
An aircraft is comprised of a multitude of components,
and each one of them contributes to the overall aircraft
vulnerability. Some components contribute much more than
the others, and for that reason they are called critical
components. Thus, a component is categorized as critical,
if a hit by a damage causing mechanism on the component
leads to an aircraft kill. If an aircraft is comprised of
N non-redundant critical components, then the aircraft will
survive if and only if each of the N critical components
survives. Thus, the aircraft's probability of survival
after the first hit, P a
(1)
, will be
p (1) m p (1) , p (1) , p (1), mmm ,p (1) (16)
s s
x
s 2 s 3 sN
17













ities of survival of critical component 1,2,3,. ..N , after
the first shot. If one takes into consideration equation
(3) the probability of aircraft survival could be written as
P (1) = n P e
(1)
=* n (1 - P. (1) ) (17)
s i=l si i«l Ki
where P is the probability of survival of the ith com-
i (1)ponent after the first shot, and pv *s tne probability
i
of kill of the ith component after the first shot.
If there are sets of redundant critical components, the
validity of equation (16) breaks down, that is, a hit on a
redundant critical component does not constitute an air-
craft kill, since another component could sustain the air-
craft flight. This can be best illustrated by the following
example aircraft, which is comprised of four critical com-
ponents , the pilot, the fuel tank and the redundant set of
engines one and two. (The aircraft is assumed to be capable
of flying on only one engine.) The probability that the
aircraft will survive the first shot is




where Pe / pe and P ' are the probabilitiess
p
SF SEE
of survival of the pilot, the fuel tank, and either one or
both engines respectively, since both engines must be killed
18

simultaneously in order to kill the aircraft. The pro-
bability that either engine one or engine two or both







where P, and P, are the probability of kill of
KE1 KE2
engines one and two, respectively, and the product of
P, and P, is the probability that both engines willKE1 KE2
be killed by the first shot. This last concept is an
interesting one and will now be investigated further.
In the following investigation, the one-dimensional
expression for the Cookie Cutter and Carleton kill functions
will be utilized along with the one-dimensional probability
of hit density function. First, using the Cookie Cutter
approach, figure 1 represents the situation for the vulner-






a b A/C centroid >x
Figure 1. Vulnerability of Two Separate Redundant Criti-
cal Components, Cookie Cutter Approach
19

In figure 1, the x-axis represents the aircraft length
(vice area, since one-dimensional analysis is used) , a-b
is the vulnerable length of redundant component one, and
c-d is the vulnerable length of redundant component two.
In this approach, the kills of redundant components one and
two are mutually exclusive events; if component one is
killed on the hit, then component two is still alive and
vice versa, since only one vulnerable length could be hit
at one time.
With the Carleton kill function shown in figure 2
everything changes. As seen from figure 2, the kills of














A hit anywhere from -• to +» will have a non-zero
probability of killing both redundant critical components.
In essence, the Carle ton kill function creates an overlap
of the components. Thus, one hit can possibly kill the
aircraft because both redundant components can be killed by
one hit.
Returning back to the example aircraft, equation (18)
becomes





p *F ^1 ^2
This equation is valid for an aircraft with one set of two
redundant critical components where only a kill of both of
them will result in an aircraft kill. There are some
other combinations of redundant critical components that
one might encounter in a kill tree analysis. They are
(1) A set of three- redundant critical components and
only a kill of all three will result in an aircraft kill.
For this particular combination, the aircraft kill logical
expression due to just the redundant set will be
A/C KILLRC = (RC1.AND.RC2.AND.RC3)
while the probability of any one, any two or all three
components surviving the first shot, will be given by
21

p (W , ! - p (1) . P <1> * p (1) (21)
S RC RC1 RC2 KRC3
where P. , Pv , Pv are the probabilities of
*RC KRC2 KRC3
kill for redundant critical components one, two and three,
respe cti ve ly
.
(2) A set of three redundant critical coirponents and
a kill of any two out of three will result in an aircraft
kill. The logical expression for this combination is
A/C KILLRC = (RC1.AND. RC2) .OR. (RC2.AND. RC3) .OR. (RC1.AND.RC3)
while the probability of any two or all three redundant
critical components, surviving the first shot will be








SPC KKCL KRC2 KR2 XRC3
(22)
- P (D * P CD + P (1) * P CD * P CDk k *k *k *k
*BCl *RC3 *EC1 KK2 KRC1
(3) A set of four redundant critical components and a
kill of any two out of four will result in an aircraft
kill. The logical expression for this combination will
be
A/C KIL^ - (RC1.AND.RC2) .OR. (RC1. AND. RC3) .OR. (RC1. AND. RC4)
.OR. (RC2.AND.RC3) .OR.(BC2. <AND.EC4) .OR. (RC3.3ND.BC4)
22

while the probability of any two, three or all four critical
components surviving the first shot will be.








- p CD * p CD . p CD * p (1)V k k kKBC1 KPC4 KPC2 *RC3
. p (1) * p CD - p CD * p (1)kK2 kRC4 ^3 kBC4
(1) * p (1) * p (1) + p (1) * p (1) * p (1)
lc k k k k k
*RC1 KRC2 *EC3 KRC1 *RC2 *RC4
+ p <U * p (1) * p (1) + p (1) * p (1) * p (1)k
RCl kRC3 kRC4 kRC2 kBC3 KBC4
+ p (1) * p (1) * p (1) * p (1) (23)K
ECL *RC2 KBC3 KRC4
(4) A set of four redundant critical components and a
kill of any three out of four will result in an aircraft
kill. The logical expression for this combination is
A/C KILLRC = (RC1.AND.RC2.AND.RC3) .OR. (RC1. AND. RC2 . AND. RC4)
.OR. (RC1.AND.RC3.AND.RC4)
.OR. (RC2.AND.RC3.AND.RC4)
while the probability of any one, two, three or all four
redundant components surviving the first shot will be
23







S RC RC1 RC2 *RC3
_
(1) * p (1) * p (1)k k k
*RCl RC2 *RC4
- p CD * p (D* p (1)k k kKRC1 KRC3 KRC4










*RC1 *RC2 *RC3 *RC4
(5) A set of four redundant critical components and a
kill of all four only will result in an aircraft kill.
The logical expression for this combination will
A/C KIL^
RC RC1.AND.RC2.AND.RC3.AND.RC4
while the probability that any one, two, three or all four
redundant components will survive the first shot will
P (1) . 1 . p (1) * P (1) * p (1) * P (1) (25)S RC KRC1 KRC2 KRC3 KRC4
24

IV. PR/H AND REDUNDANCY
The analysis done in the previous chapter, though
necessary, was limited to the probability that an aircraft
is killed due to a single shot. A further and more
realistic analysis stems from the fact that in any given
combat scenario, an aircraft is likely to take multiple
hits. Thus, the total probability of kill of an aircraft
that has taken multiple hits will now be examined.
If one assumes that an aircraft consists of N critical
components and that it has taken n hits is given by
p -in) .p (1) * P <2), p (3) Kmj W . J , (J) (26)











s i si si si
ities that the ith critical component will survive the
first, second, third. ..nth hit, respectively. Using a
parallel which may be inferred from equation (17)
,
-(n) n jP Kn} = n (1 - P ) (27)si J=l k/ni
where Pk/h is the probability that the ith component will
be killed by the jth hit. In a similar manner, the total







= jli U - PK/Hj ) (28)
where pv/xP is **© probability that the aircraft will be
killed by the jth hit.
In the case of an aircraft consisting of only non-
redundant critical components, the pK /H does not change
with each hit because the vulnerable area is constant for
each hit. However, in the case of redundant critical com-
ponents, pv/h changes considerably due to the increasing
probability the redundant critical components are killed and
thus, it will be studied separately.
The simplest approach to the pK/H with redundancy
study is through the use of a kill tree diagram. For that,
assume an A/C consisting of three non-redundant critical com-
ponents CC1, CC2 and CC3, with individual probabilities of
kill PK /H i pk/h ' PK/H ' resPectivelv ' an<^ or set of
JL w J
two redundant critical components RCC1 and RCC2 with indi-




tively. Thus, the kill diagram is depicted on
-(1)
figure 3 for the first hit on the aircraft and the P.K/H



















(NO KILL) (NO KILL) (NO KILL)
Figure 3. Aircraft Kill Tree Diagram, First Hit
In order for the A/C to be killed by the second hit, one
must assume that it survived the first hit, and therefore
only the RCC1, RCC2 and NK1 branches will be affected by
the second hit. Thus, the kill tree for the second hit
alone is depicted on figures 4a, 4b and 4c.
RCC1
CC1 CC2 CC3 RCC1 RCC2
(KILL) (KILL) (KILL) (NO KILL) (KILL)
NK1
(NO KILL)






(KILL) (KILL) (NO KILL) (NO KILL)




(NO KILL) (NO KILL) (NO KILL)
Figure 4c. Aircraft Kill Tree Diagram, Second Hit Alone




(2) (1) , (2) <2) (2) (2)PK ~ k/H^ \ k/H i ^2 k/H 3 k/H R2,









+ P (1) * v (2) * P (2)
\
Pk/HRl k^H2 / (30)
where p
s
is ^e probability that all of the critical
components survived the first hit (the NK1 branch) . Thus,
-(2)
the total probability of kill for the two hits PK/H
becomes
V <2) = PK~ U) + PK <2) <31>
One could go on to the third and subsequent hits in a
similar manner, and the PK /H will be increasing as more
and more terms are added for the subsequent hits.
Another method of computing the total probability of
kill is the transition matrix method [2]. Using that
method on the following example aircraft, one can clearly
see the effect of redundancy on the PK /H •
29

A/C #1 (NO REDUNDANCY)





Total aircraft area present to the threat propagator is
2
assumed to be A_ 500 ft , and A_ is the area pre-
P pi
sented by the ith component, ?,~ is the probability of
ith component given a hit on the ith component, and A





is the vulnerable area of the ith component. The
logical kill expression for this aircraft will be
A/C KILL - PILOT. OR.ENGINE. OR. FUEL. OR. CONTROLS















12. 5 .6 7.5
12. 5 .6 7.5
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The logical expression for this aircraft is
A/C KILL = PILOT. OR. ENGINE. OR. FUEL. OR. (CONTROLI. AND. CONTROLII)








The logical kill expression for this aircraft is
A/C KILL = PILOT. OR. FUEL. OR. CONTROLS. OR. (ENGINEI.AND.
ENGINEII)
A/C #4 (77% REDUNDANT) A =5 30 ft2







The logical expression for A/C #4 is













CUMULATIVE PROBABILITIES OF KILL FOR EXAMPLE AIRCRAFT




.1360 .1060 .0830 .0377
V l2) = .25 35 .2012 .16 32 .0788
P
- (3)




.4227 .3633 .3117 .1662
V (5 ' ~ .5185 .4320 .3788 .2107





.6406 .5485 .4984 .2981
V (8) S .6895 .5978 .5508 .340 3
V (9) = .7317 .6418 .5986 .3809
p -do) = .7682 .6 811 .6419 .4199
Figure 5 compares the P. for the nonredundant aircraft #1

















Note that the values of A and P. - are assumed,
P . k/h.
while the values of A are computed through the equation
A - A * P, /v (32)v
± p± k/h±
Through the use of the transition matrix method (see
Appendix B) , the values of P^ for the example aircraft
have been found and are presented in Table 1.
As can be very easily seen from Table 1, the P, for




V. AFATL POOL COMPUTER PROGRAM AND THE PR/H
As shown by the previous chapters, the determination of
the survivability of an aircraft can be a very complex and
time consuming task. Thus, the aid of the computer has been
employed, and several programs have been developed by both
the military and the civilian industry. One that was
selected for use by the Joint Technical Coordinating Group
for Aircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS) Survivability Assessment
Subgroup, is the Antiaircraft Artillery Simulation Computer
Program, AFATL Program POOL This program is currently in
use at the Naval Postgraduate School and is the one that
this study will be concerned with.
Many modifications have been made to the P001 that was
originally developed by the Weapons Systems Analysis
Division of the Air Force Armament Laboratory at Eglin Air
Force Base, Florida. The latest version of it used by Naval
Weapons Center, China Lake, employs an aircraft consisting
of twenty (20) critical components and computes the single
shot probability of kill of a target (after consideration
is given to various errors in predicting an aircraft/
projectile intercept point) . Computation of the pKSc is
performed throughout the entire flight path and after the
accumulation of all shots, the total probability of target
35

attrition is presented. In the computation of the cumulative
P_ , redundancy of the critical components has not been
taken into consideration. This is a potential source of
error in the final results, since the majority of the
present aircraft have some degree of redundancy.
In the latest version of P001, the computation of the
single shot probability of kill is performed in the "FIFE"
section of the program. The equation used to compute the
probability of killing, at least one critical component by
a single round, PR , is presented on line 717 of the
program listing given in Appendix C, and it states
Pfc = PK + PKS(IJ) - Pk*PKS(IJ) - PK + PKS(IJ)*(1 - PK)
where the initial value of PR is set to zero and PK_, _.
is the probability of killing component IJ by a single
round. This equation does not account for redundancy
because component IJ might be redundant in the aircraft
and killing it will not constitute an aircraft kill, as it
was discussed in Chapter 3. Thus, in order for the program
to account for possible redundancy of components, the




IJ1 the total number of non-redundant components
IJ22 = the total number of sets of two redundant components
of which two must be killed for a subsystem kill
IJ2 3 - the total number of sets of three redundant components
of which two must be killed for a subsystem kill
IJ33 = the total number of sets of three redundant components
of which three must be killed for a subsystem kill
IJ24 the total number of sets of four redundant components
of which two must be killed for a subsystem kill
IJ34 = the total number of sets of four redundant components
of which three must be killed for a subsystem kill
IJ44 the total number of sets of four redundant components
of which four must be killed for a subsystem kill




MN(I) = A column matrix containing the numbers of the non-
redundant components (I=1,IJ1)
M22(I,J) = A (IJ22x2) matrix containing the IJ22 pairs of
redundant components (I=1,IJ22, J=l,2)
M2 3(I,J) = A (IJ2 3x3) matrix containing the IJ2 3 sets of
three redundant components (I=1,IJ2 3, J=l,3)
M33(I,J) = A (IJ33x3) matrix containing the IJ33 sets of
three redundant components (I=1,IJ33, J=l,3)
M24(I,J) - A (IJ2 4x4) matrix containing the IJ24 sets of
four redundant components (I=1,IJ2 4, J=l,4)
M34(I,J) = A (IJ34x4) matrix containing the IJ34 sets of
four redundant components (I=1,IJ34, J=l,4)
M44(I,J) = A (IJ44x4) matrix containing the IJ44 sets of
four redundant components (I=1,IJ44, J=l,4)
38

The user must create a file containing the number of the
non-redundant components, then redundant components them-
selves, the number of the IJ22,IJ23,IJ33,IJ24,IJ34,IJ44 sets,
and the numbers of the components that belong to each set as
shown below:
^ iH CM rH CM
ib m •* »
•"3 iH rH CM CM
•w CM CM CM CM CM




i ' i i'1-i'i 111 ini ri i i i i i i i i i
CM CM /"•» /-N /—
\
CM CM tH CM CO










CM CMS s H-l a s
etc. (max # of
characters = 38)
Ul 2*IJ22 3*IJ23
Once the file is constructed, the MN,M22,M2 3,M33,M24,M34,M44










IF IJ22=0 GO TO 10
39

DO 15 K=l, IJ22
M22(K,1)=TEMP(I+K)





IF IJ2 3=0 GO TO 20
DO 25 K=1,U23
M2 3(K,1)=TEMP(I+K)
M2 3 (K , 2 ) +TEMP ( I+K+ 1)






IF IJ33 =0 GO TO 30
DO 35 K=1,IJ33
M33(K,1)=TEMP(I+K)
M33 (K,2) =TEMP (I+K+l)







IF IJ2 4=0 GO TO 40
DO 45 K=1,U24
M2 4(K,1)=TEMP(I+K)
M2 4 (K , 2 ) =TEMP ( I+K+l)
M2 4 (K , 3) =TEMP ( I+K+2
)









M34 (K , 3) =TEMP ( I+K+2
















Once the matrices have been constructed, the following
subroutine could be used to compute the cumulative prob-
ability of aircraft survival. The cumulative probability
of kill of each of the components (CPKS(IJ)) is computed
at line 722. This probability is computed for all of the
components in the DO to 460 loop. Immediately after the
460 loop (before line 72) a call to the following sub-
routine should be made. The parameter computed by this
subroutine is the probability the aircraft has survived
the encounter up to the current time, PS , the cumulative
probability of survival. Note that the PK and PS
computed at lines 717, 72 7, and 732 are no longer valid








CPKS is the cumulative probability of survival of the
component
5 CONTINUE




PS=PS* ( 1 . -CPKS (L) *CPKS (M)
)
15 CONTINUE





PS=PS* (1 . -CPKS (L) *CPKS (M) -CPKS (L) *CPKS (N)



















PS=PS*(1.-CPKS(L) *CPKS(M)-CPKS(L) *CPKS (N) -CPKS (L)
* *CPKS (I) -CPKS (M) *CPKS (N) -CPKS (M) *CPKS (I)
*
-CPKS (N) *CPKS (I) +CPKS (L) *CPKS (M) *CPKS (N)
* +CPKS (L) *CPKS (M) *CPKS (I) +CPKS (L) *CPKS (N)
* *CPKS(I)+CPKS(M) *CPKS(N) *CPKS (I) +CPKS (L)*CPKS (M)
* *CPKS(N)*CPKS(I))
45 CONTINUE








PS=PS*(1.-CPKS(L)*CPKS(M) *CPKS (N) -CPKS (L) *CPKS (M)
*CPKS (I) -CPKS (L) *CPKS (N) *CPKS (I) -CPKS (M)
*CPKS (N) *CPKS (I) +CPKS (L) *CPKS (M) *CPKS (N)
*CPKS(D)
55 CONTINUE






PS=PS* (1. -CPKS (L) *CPKS (M) *CPKS (N) *CPKS (I)
)
65 CONTINUE
70 WRITE (6,100) PS








The probability of kill of an aircraft given a single
shot is a linear function of the aircraft's vulnerable area,
Redundancy of critical components greatly enhances the
probability of survival and in the Cookie Cutter approach
the kills of redundant critical components are mutually
exclusive events, where as in the Carleton approach they
are not. For an aircraft, hit by multiple shots the
cumulative probability of kill for the same shot decreases
as the redundancy built into the aircraft increases. The
modifications proposed in Chapter V should provide a
significant improvement in the overall efficiency of the
Antiaircraft Artillery Simulation Computer Program, since





(1) Evaluation of equation (12)«
KSS -f "(I) *§-exp(-^)dr (
Jrs
1)
Using integration by parts, let - ^-^ u
2cT





- exp(u) du = - exp I- r—s-
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= 1 - exp (- -X-)




t £j expa (**)
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Using integration by parts , let - r ( —j + —5- j = u
2a r
Differentiation yields - 2r ( —j + —j ) ^r = du2a r
therefore
kss - 2a 2 j 1 ; 1 ;
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(3) Evaluation of equation (14).
KSS
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Integrating each integrand I and I yields
x y
x=| expj-px2 *x2+qx*xjdx - exp -[
—oo / •'—oo
2* 2
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But in general, —±— | exp { - ^- z } dz = 1 or
I










- u j. du = /2tt or
exp < - u >du = /ir
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exp {-* x +T2~T ^ I 2a + a a + a
L x, x. y x y 2
If we assume that a.. a.. and A = 2irc a
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P~K CALCULATIONS THROUGH THE TRANSITION MATRIX METHOD
TABLE 2
Computation of the Transition Matrix (T) for Example A/C #3
Probability of Transitioning from this State to this S tate
Knrc Krcl Krc2 Krc Nk









2 4/5 30 24/5 30 1 Krc
438/530 Nk
! (Note that the sum of each column is unity.)
Now, let the probability that the aircraft exists in each of
of the five possible states after the jth hit be expressed










The probability that the aircraft is in each of the five
states after the (j+l)th hit is
{s} ( 3+1 > = [T]{s}<3> (B-D
that is, the aircraft transitions from < S > ^ to / S > -1
to [T], Thus, the cumulative probability the aircraft is
killed after j+1 hit, P~K / is given by
PK
( 3+1 » = Knrc^ 11 Krc ( 3+1 >
Prior to the first hit, the aircraft is entirely in the Nk
state. Thus, according to equation (B-l)
,
(0)
















Similarly, for the second hit,
























Thus, after the second hit
PR
(2)
= .1591 + .0041
Similarly, the values for P„
obtained to yield Table 1.
» (3) * (4)
,






704 C COMPUTE SURVIVAL AND KILL PROBABILITIES
705 C




70 8 CC PKS(IJ) IS THE PROBABILITY OF KILLING COMPONENT IJ
BY A SINGLE ROUND
709 CC (ONE BARREL)
710 C
711 PKS(IJ)=AMIN1 (1.0, DIVIDE (EXP (-. 5 *STUFF) *AVTPI,
712 SQRT ( (SXF2+1AVTPI) *(SYF2+AVTPI) ) )
)
713 C
714 CC PK IS THE PROBABILITY OF KILLING AT LEAST ONE
COMPONENT BY A SINGLE








720 CC BY THIS GUN LOCATION FOR THE ENTIRE AIRCRAFT FLIGHT
PATH
721 C
722 460 CPKS(IJ)=a»KS(IJ) + (l-U-PKS(IJ)) **ISB) -(CPKS (IJ)
*
72 3 * ( 1- (1-PKS (IJ) **ISB) )
72 4 C





729 CC PK IS THE PROBABILITY OF KILLING AT LEAST ONE
COMPONENT BY ISB
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